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1 Introduction 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) monetizes the climatic benefits associated with 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions when such reductions are marginal to total 
global emissions.  In early 2010, the United States government published estimates 
of the SCC for use in regulatory cost-benefit analysis. These estimates, intended to 
capture the climatic benefits of regulations that reduce carbon emissions, are based 
on the expected damages associated with an extra ton of emissions (Interagency 
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon 2010). 
Growing attention has been paid in recent years, however, to the possibility 
that climate change could lead, with uncertain probability, to catastrophic impacts.  
Reducing a ton of emissions not only lowers expected damages but also lowers the 
probability that catastrophic damages occur.  Individuals are generally thought to 
be risk-averse with respect to low-probability/high-consequence events.1  This 
means they would be willing to pay more than the expected reduction in damages 
to lower the probability of a catastrophe.  The SCC should then also include an 
estimate of the risk reduction benefits of abatement.2  We will refer to the extra 
amount on the SCC above expected damages that reflects the willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) for a reduction in risk as the “risk premium” (RP). 
This paper reviews the literature on adding a RP to the SCC.  There are very 
few papers that actually calculate such a premium explicitly, although there are 
some that implicitly include a RP in their estimates or suggest methods that could 
be used to do so.  Our specific focus here is on analysis of marginal changes in 
emissions, but we also review papers that estimate a “global” RP, or the extra 
WTP for worldwide abatement.  The work done to date can be divided into three 
approaches for calculating a RP: using expected utility (EU) theory to calculate a 
dollar value for the RP, conceptualizing the RP as an alteration to the discount 
_________________________ 
1 For instance, homeowners routinely purchase insurance that is priced substantially above the 
expected annual loss.  
2 While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)’s Circular A-4 states that risk neutrality 
should be the default for government projects, Newbold and Daigneault (2010) argue that risk 
aversion makes more sense for climate change since the potential impacts are global, damages could 
be very large, and correlation among risks undermines any risk sharing arrangement.  OMB guidance 
notes that risk neutrality “is appropriate as long as society is ‘risk neutral’ with respect to the 
regulatory alternatives” and permits alternate assumptions about risk aversion where reasonable 
grounds for such assumptions exist (Office of Management and Budget 2003). 
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rate, or by giving extra weight in decision making to worst case scenarios.  We 
provide more detail on all three approaches in this paper.  Contrary to some 
theoretical arguments that a RP is not warranted or would be so negligible as to be 
not worth consideration, the work in this small literature to date suggests that the 
RP on the SCC could be significant.  Still, there is much more research that needs 
to be done on this topic. 
In Section 2, we first introduce the concept of a risk premium in more detail.  
We then turn in Section 3 to a discussion of the theoretical work on risk premiums 
related to climate abatement decisions, including a discussion of two key features 
of a RP calculation: one, specifying climate damages and two, including 
uncertainty and adopting a risk-averse utility function.  Section 4 discusses the 
three methods used to date to examine risk premia and summarizes the findings 
from each.  We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of the implications of the 
RP research we review and directions for future research. 
2 Defining a Risk Premium 
The SCC is an estimate of the present value of damages avoided from a marginal 
reduction in carbon emissions.  It monetizes the global economic damage caused 
through enhanced climate change from emitting a ton of carbon. It is usually 
estimated using integrated assessment models (IAMs), which jointly model the 
climate and the economy.3  It is calculated for a given year as the change in 
expected welfare over a unit change in emissions, normalized with respect to a 
welfare-equivalent change in consumption.  Estimates are presented as dollars per 
metric ton of carbon or of carbon dioxide.4  When emissions are reduced by a ton, 
not only do expected damages decrease, but the “fat tail” of low-probability, high-
impact damages thins. Risk-averse individuals are willing to pay for this reduction 
in risk under many conditions.  Indeed, risk-averse individuals will pay for a mean 
_________________________ 
3 There are many assumptions built into the IAMs.  There has been a substantial amount of work on 
investigating these and exploring their implications for the SCC. We put aside these issues in this 
current paper to focus on the issue of a risk premium. For a broader discussion, see Kopp and 
Mignone (this issue). 
4 SCC values per metric ton carbon dioxide are equal to SCC values per metric ton carbon times the 
ratio of the atomic mass of carbon to the molecular mass of carbon dioxide (12/44). 
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preserving reduction in the variance of losses.  With abatement, we reduce both the 
mean and the variance of losses. 
We use the term “risk premium” (RP) to refer to the maximum WTP for the 
reduction in risk.  It is the amount beyond the reduction in the expected value that 
a risk-averse individual would be willing to pay to reduce a risk.  A RP is defined 
with reference to a risk-averse utility function, u(.),which we take here to simply 
be over consumption.  As an illustration, let c be total consumption without a 
climate catastrophe, d be damages from a climate catastrophe, p0 be the probability 
of a catastrophe with business-as-usual (BAU) emissions, and (p0 – Δ) be the 
probability of catastrophe with marginally lower emissions. The individual will be 
willing to pay at least expected damages for the reduction in risk associated with 
lowering the probability of damages by Δ.  This amount is d*Δ.  The RP is the 
additional amount beyond expected damages they would pay and is defined as:  
 
  ݌଴ ∗ ݑሺܿ െ ݀ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌଴ሻ ∗ ݑሺܿሻ ൌ                                 (1) 
ሺ݌଴ െ ∆ሻ ∗ ݑሺܿ െ ሺ݀ ∗ ∆ሻ െ ܴܲሺ∆ሻሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ሺ݌଴ െ ∆ሻሻ ∗ ݑሺܿ െ ሺ݀ ∗ ∆ሻ െ ܴܲሺ∆ሻሻ. 
Under this definition, the RP is calculated in dollars.  If a utility function is 
assumed, then the RP could be calculated from this definition (sufficiently 
modified to include more than two states of the world).   
Individuals pay risk premia routinely when purchasing insurance or financial 
assets.  These decisions provide two specific types of WTP to reduce risk that are 
relevant for our discussion, since a number of climate economics papers use the 
analogy of insurance and/or draw heavily on financial models, particularly asset 
pricing theory, to address risk and uncertainty related to climate change.  In 
insurance, the term “risk premium” refers to the amount by which an annual 
insurance premium exceeds the expected annual costs.  With an insurance policy, 
damages are reimbursed but the probability is not modified and so the RP is a 
WTP to lower damages in the disaster state of the world.  Fully insuring equalizes 
wealth in the two states of the world with and without a disaster.  Consumers 
would pay the expected damages for this policy and an additional amount 
specified by the RP.  Modifying equation (1) for the particular case of fully 
insuring all damages gives: 
݌ ∗ ݑሺܿ െ ݀ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ∗ ݑሺܿሻ ൌ ݑሺܿ െ ሺ݌ ∗ ݀ሻ െ ܴܲሺ݀ሻሻ.  (2) 
Again, the RP is measured in dollars. 
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In finance, the RP is the amount added to a risk-free investment to make 
expected returns equal a risky investment.  In this case, the RP is a rate of return.  
The expected return of a risky investment, rr, is equal to the rate of return for a safe 
asset, rs, plus some risk premium: 
ݎ௥ୀ	ݎ௦ ൅ ܴܲ.  (3) 
While (3) looks like it is of a decidedly different form than equations (1) and (2), 
note that both (1) and (2) equate the expected utility of a risky position with the 
expected utility of a less risky position, which is achieved by paying a RP.  If we 
were to examine the utility associated with the rates of return of the investments, 
equation (3) is also exactly of this form, but the RP is a rate, not a dollar value. 
These equations suggest two ways to formulate calculation of a RP for climate 
change abatement.  The RP can be calculated specifically through the utility 
function as a payment that is decremented from consumption (or wealth) as in 
equations (1) and (2); alternatively, it can be calculated through rates of return—or 
discounting—as in equation (3) (more on this in Section 4).  The former approach 
conceptualizes abatement as a type of hazard mitigation investment, while the 
latter approach considers abatement as a type of investment to be added to the 
portfolio of investments being held by society. 
Some authors have argued that despite discussion of “risk” premia, with 
climate change catastrophes we are in a situation of Knightian uncertainty as 
opposed to risk.  Research suggests that in cases of ambiguity, where we are 
uncertain of the probabilities, individuals might command an ambiguity premium 
(Viscusi and Chesson 1999).  This has also been found to be the case with 
insurance companies (Kunreuther and Hogarth 1992).  If governmental policy 
should reflect these preferences, it suggests an even higher WTP to reduce climate 
catastrophe risk than would be found in the risk premium calculations and would 
be a “shadow ambiguity premium” on the SCC (Hennlock 2009).  This premium 
could be calculated through the discount rate as well, such that when the growth 
rate is uncertain, there is both a risk premium and an ambiguity premium 
correction to the social discount rate (Millner et al. 2010). 
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3 Theoretical Background 
Many authors have discussed the concept of a risk premium in theory without 
attempting to estimate the value of the RP.  These theoretical discussions are 
briefly reviewed here.  They suggest that there are two components of climate 
models that will disproportionately impact RP estimates: how climate damages are 
modeled, and how uncertainty and risk aversion are treated.  Both of these are 
discussed subsequently. 
3.1 Is a High Risk Premium Warranted? 
Several authors have speculated about whether a RP should be added to the SCC 
and, if so, what its likely magnitude would be.  Mendelsohn (2008) notes that, 
since uncertainty about the damages associated with an extra ton of emissions in 
the very near term is low and on a per capita basis “quite small,” perhaps no RP 
should be applied to current emissions.  On the other hand, Tol (2008) notes that, 
given the great uncertainty surrounding climate change impacts, a RP is warranted.  
Yohe and Tol (2008) argue that, while the extent of the RP to be added to the SCC 
is uncertain, “it should be clear that no reasonable person would argue that this 
premium should be zero” (p. 237), and guess that an estimate of 50% of current 
estimates is “not out of the question” (p. 237).  None of these authors present 
calculations to support their estimates. 
One of the most detailed discussions of whether there should be a risk 
premium on the SCC is given by Nordhaus (2007).  He draws on the consumption 
capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) to state that there will be a positive risk 
premium if damages occur when the marginal utility of consumption is high, i.e., 
when society is relatively poor.  To evaluate the relationship between consumption 
and climate damages, he conducts a 100-sample Monte Carlo analysis using his 
integrated assessment model, DICE. In these samples, he draws from normal 
distributions representing uncertainty in the productivity growth rate, climate 
sensitivity, the coefficient of the quadratic damage function, and five other socio-
economic and physical factors. He concludes that high-temperature outcomes are 
positively correlated with consumption. Because the largest damages occur when 
society is wealthy, this indicates a negative risk premium.  He suggests the 
intuitive idea that if climate damages occur when an individual is rich and has four 
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mansions, but climate change damages one of them, that individual wouldn’t want 
to shift to a state with no damages, but in which he lives in a cave.   
However, Nordhaus’ analysis, which is based on normal distributions and is 
dominated by uncertainty in productivity growth, neglects climate catastrophes 
that could generate low consumption levels in high warming states of the world.  It 
is this possibility that worries authors investigating risk premia.  For example, 
projected levels of warming could lead to serious national security concerns, and 
could be a threat multiplier for instability in some regions (e.g., CNA Corporation 
2007). Warming exceeding 7°C would even directly render increasingly large 
portions of currently inhabited regions uninhabitable (Sherwood and Huber 2010). 
3.2 Damage Functions  
This discussion suggests that how damage functions in IAMs treat high 
temperature states of the world is critical to understanding whether and what 
magnitude of a RP should be added to the SCC.  To calculate an accurate RP, the 
full range of downside risk must be included in the models.  Catastrophic damages 
can result from large scale impacts associated with accumulated gradual 
environmental changes or associated with abrupt changes (Dietz et al. 2007).  In 
addition, some Earth system tipping point behaviors can generate positive 
feedbacks that accelerate and amplify these damages. These high-damage states of 
the world may be associated with high WTP to buy down the risk.  
The notion of catastrophic impacts has been addressed in IAMs for nearly two 
decades.  For early examinations of the issue, see, for example, Nordhaus (1994); 
Yohe (1996); and Roughgarden and Schneider (1999).  Damages from high 
temperature scenarios have been modeled in various ways.  Some authors add 
extra factors to the damage function for high-temperature scenarios, perhaps in a 
stochastic fashion (e.g., Gjerde et al. 1999).  Azar and Lindgren (2003) use DICE, 
a commonly used IAM developed by William Nordhaus (Nordhaus 2008), but add 
a low probability state that has catastrophic damages.  Other authors have tried to 
model specific threshold responses, a classic one being shutdown of the Atlantic 
Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), for example, by defining an 
emissions threshold that when crossed leads to higher damages  (e.g., McInerney 
and Keller 2008).  The extra damages once a threshold is crossed could also be 
probabilistic (e.g., McInerney et al. forthcoming).  Some other authors, such as 
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Ceronsky et al. (2005), attempt to model particular climate change scenarios that 
could generate high damages.  Finally, many authors have tried to alter the base 
damage function in IAMs to create a function that generates higher damages for 
higher temperature levels.  For instance, some attention has focused on the 
exponent used in the damage function in DICE (e.g., Ackerman et al. 2009).  
Mastrandrea and Schneider (2001) add a term to the exponent in the DICE damage 
function whose value is determined by a climate model that simulates AMOC 
collapse. 
3.3 Modeling Uncertainty and Risk Aversion 
In addition to including potential catastrophic impacts from climate change, IAMs 
must be able to address uncertainty explicitly in order to calculate a RP and must 
use a risk-averse utility function.  As Dietz et al. (2007) note, to properly account 
for risk aversion, the discounted utility from each Monte Carlo draw—each 
possible outcome of climate change—must be calculated and then weighted by its 
probability of occurring.  Calculating expected consumption instead of expected 
utility can understate risks (Dietz et al. 2007). 
The standard CRRA utility function is used in most climate change economics 
modeling.  With c denoting consumption and η the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, it is: 
ܷ ൌ 	 ௖భషആሺଵିఎሻ, for η≠1; ܷ ൌ 	ln	ሺܿሻ, for η=1. (4) 
In many IAMs, utility is summed over individuals (generally assuming individuals 
have identical preferences) and time and discounted back to the present to 
calculate social welfare.5    
  
_________________________ 
5 It should be noted that if individuals in a population have utility functions of the form (4), then the 
sum of these utility functions will not be of this form. The consequences of using a proxy CRAA 
utility with an average value of  and multiplying by the population, as opposed to summing the 
individual utilities, can be profound. Dispersion in marginal utility of consumption across a 
population is largely responsible for the difference between the expected SCC and the ‘certainty-
equivalent SCC’ described by Newbold et al. (2010). 
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Assuming a CRRA utility function, the parameter η, which governs the 
curvature of the utility function, gives an indication of aversion to risk, as well as 
preferences over intertemporal substitution and intragenerational inequality.  These 
need not be the same, however.  Sælen et al. (2009) find that correlations among 
these three sets of preferences are weak and suggests that models that disentangle 
these attitudes would be worth pursing further.  More relevant for risk premium 
calculations, the authors find high levels of risk aversion among survey 
respondents to policies that involve substantial losses, suggesting climate risk 
premiums could be non-trivial.  Nestle (2008) found that risk aversion related to 
climate damages grows with assets at risk and is greater for damages that are 
irreversible, generate health impacts, or create a risk of loss of life.   
There are several available models that disentangle these effects (Traeger 
2009).  In the context of climate change, Crost and Traeger (2010) use a recursive 
dynamic programming model based on DICE and adopt a recursive utility 
approach to separate out attitudes about intertemporal substitution and risk 
aversion.  Teasing apart these two effects prevents them from being able to use the 
standard optimal control framework of other IAMs.  They find that doing so leads 
to higher optimal levels of abatement and higher SCC values.   
In addition to the tangling of preferences through the CRRA utility function, 
the DICE IAM (and perhaps other IAMs, such as MERGE) is built around the 
deterministic Ramsey model (more on this below).  Gerst et al. (in prep.) replace 
the Ramsey model in DICE with the Lucas-Mehra-Prescott model from macro-
finance to explicitly address decision-making under uncertainty by separating 
investments in safe and risky assets.  Using historical data to model the growth 
rate, they find higher levels of risk aversion than typically assumed and that 
traditional approaches significantly underweight risk reduction benefits associated 
with abatement.  They also conclude that aversion to risk is far more important in 
driving optimal abatement levels than a thin or fat tailed distribution over climate 
sensitivity, as long as the welfare function is reasonably bounded from below. 
Of course, the debate about the CRRA utility function that has dominated the 
literature since Weitzman’s comment on the Stern Review (Weitzman 2007a) 
concerns its limit properties, which can be critical in RP calculations as discussed 
in the next section.  As consumption tends toward zero, utility tends toward 
negative infinity.  Discussions in the literature revolve around approaches to 
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bounding the utility function or damages to retain plausible model results (e.g., 
Dietz 2011a). 
4 Methods for Calculating Risk Premia 
We now turn to papers that estimate a risk premium.  There are very few papers 
that explicitly calculate the risk reduction value of a marginal change in carbon 
emissions that could be added to the SCC; more often such a premium may be 
implicitly included in SCC values.  There are also some papers that calculate a risk 
premium in a global sense of WTP for worldwide abatement.  Some of these 
papers, and others, suggest methods for calculating a marginal RP and they are 
discussed in this section as well. 
Estimation approaches fall into three main groups.  The first calculates a RP 
directly from expected utility.  The second addresses risk premia in the context of 
discounting, as in the financial approach.  The third is papers we loosely group as 
“worst case approaches” that adjust the objective function to take account of risk-
aversion regarding worst case climate outcomes.  These three approaches and the 
estimates are discussed in detail in the following sections.  It is worth noting that 
the value of a RP could also be estimated using contingent valuation.  As far as we 
are aware, there have been no attempts to do this. 
4.1 Expected Utility Approaches  
As discussed in Section 2, the value of a RP could be calculated directly from 
equation (1).  One way to do this is to follow the very simple model of equation 
(1), assuming two states of the world: climate change and no climate change (or 
climate disaster and no climate disaster).  This is essentially the approach taken by 
Heal and Kristrom (2002) and Heal (2009).  The drawback, of course, is that this is 
an extremely simplified model.  That is also the benefit, however, in that the 
calculation is very transparent and straightforward.  While perhaps too simplistic 
to use in policymaking, it does provide a good ballpark estimate for what the range 
of a RP may be. 
Heal and Kristrom (2002) and Heal (2009) calculate the willingness of society 
to pay to avoid the entirety of climate change.  They calculate the percentage of 
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income we would be willing to pay using a simple definitional equation.  I denotes 
societal income without climate change (the authors do not appear to let the 
economy grow over time, which given the discussion earlier, would be an 
important improvement), climate change occurs in year C, (1-δ) gives the discount 
rate, climate change drops income to Ij with probability pj, and x is the WTP to 
avoid climate risks.  This gives the following equation: 
∑௧ୀଵ஼ ߜ௧ିଵሺݑሺܫሻ െ ݑሺܫ െ ݔሻሻ ൌ ∑௧ୀ஼ାଵ் ߜ௧ିଵሺݑሺܫሻ െ	∑௝݌௝ݑሺܫ௝ሻሻ	. (5) 
For a range of plausible parameter values, they find society may wish to spend 
between 0.1% to 8.1% of income on avoiding climate change. 
Using IAMs, this approach could essentially be scaled up to account for more 
states of the world.  As stated earlier, this requires a risk-averse utility function, 
which is often assumed to be CRRA in IAMs.  This is tied to deterministic 
Ramsey discounting such that the discount rate r, can be approximated as: 
r ≈ ρ + ηg,               (6) 
where ρ gives the pure rate of time preference, η is the parameter from the CRRA 
utility function that governs the concavity of the utility function, and g is the per 
capita time average  growth rate of consumption.  The RP calculation is thus 
linked to the discount rate. This makes the lines between this approach and the one 
in the next section somewhat blurry.  Here, however, the discount rate has not 
taken account of uncertainty over the growth rate—that is discussed in the next 
section.  Also here, the RP is still seen as a dollar value to add to the SCC while 
conceptualizing abatement as a hazard reduction measure.  In the next section, 
abatement is conceived of more as another asset that society is holding, the returns 
from which are uncertain. 
As η is a measure of personal risk aversion, varying η when calculating SCC 
values can give an indication of how the SCC varies with levels of risk aversion.  
Increasing risk aversion will increase the size of the risk premium. Because of the 
entangled meanings of η, however, it will also increase discounting of wealthier 
futures, so the direction of the effect on the SCC is ambiguous.  Anthoff et al. 
(2009) use the IAM FUND to examine how the SCC responds to changes in η 
when there is uncertainty over climate parameters.  The expected social cost of 
carbon over many Monte Carlo runs at first falls as η increases but then rises, 
because more emphasis is put on the tails of the distribution.  For values of 
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ρ=1.1% and η=1.5, Anthoff et al. (2009) find that including uncertainty increases 
the SCC by about $60/ton C ($16/ton CO2) above their deterministic case, but for 
this central case, the authors do not disentangle the effects of changes in expected 
wealth and changes in the variance of wealth. By comparison, at ρ=2.0% and 
η=3.0, they find an expected SCC of over $20,000/ton C (about $5,000/ton CO2).  
This illustration shows that the level of risk aversion can be a critical driver of 
SCC and RP values. 
Crost and Traeger (2010) add complexity but still essentially adopt an EU 
framework.  They develop a recursive dynamic programming model based on 
DICE in order to maintain uncertainty in the model run.  Uncertainty in their 
model enters over the climate sensitivity parameter (modeled as a lognormal 
distribution) and over the damage function.  The damage function in DICE 
multiplies temperature raised to a constant parameter by another constant 
parameter; Crost and Traeger (2010) model uncertainty over both these 
parameters.  As mentioned earlier, they also reject the common CRRA utility 
function in order to distinguish risk aversion from other preferences.  Comparing 
their SCC results that explicitly address uncertainty with base runs which draw 
parameter values and optimize within each run, thus not accounting for 
uncertainty, gives some sense of the value of a risk premium, even though they do 
not discuss their findings in this way.  The authors find that adding uncertainty 
adds about $40/ton C to $80/ton C (about $10 to $20/ton CO2) to the SCC.  In 
addition to uncertainty, disentangling risk aversion in the utility function also 
increases SCC values by 70% at the beginning of the century and 25% at the end 
of the century.   
Gerst et al. (2010) use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model based 
on DICE.  They model uncertainty over population growth, total factor 
productivity growth, the change in carbon intensity, climate sensitivity, carbon 
cycle mass transfer, damages from climate change, and abatement costs.  They run 
their stochastic model with three different abatement scenarios and compare these 
results to results using “best guess” values of the parameters.  Using best-guess 
values underestimates damages for all the scenarios.  The authors do not offer SCC 
values with or without a RP, but such values could be calculated using their 
approach.  Instead, they examine total social welfare from the different scenarios.  
They find that ignoring uncertainty leads to an underestimation of damages.  With 
uncertainty, highest social welfare is obtained in the scenario where abatement 
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rises to 100% in 2100.  When abatement is based on Nordhaus (2008) results, 
rising from 10% in 2010 to 100% in 2250, it provides greater welfare than BAU 
but not as much as the complete abatement by 2100 scenario.  When the model is 
run deterministically with best-guess values and for a higher return on capital of 
6%, the Nordhaus scenario becomes the one offering the highest social welfare.   
Newbold and Daigneault (2009) model consumption as growing at a constant 
rate until sometime at which there is a shock that results in the loss of capital.  
They examine damages with two sigmoidal functions.  Using this simple model, 
they ask: “what is the maximum fractional reduction in consumption, now and 
forever, that society would be willing to sacrifice to reduce the probability of 
future temperature changes” from the baseline?  In order to estimate a risk 
premium, Newbold and Daigneault compare their risk-adjusted estimate of 
benefits with the utility of expected temperature changes.   
Newbold and Daigneault assume parameter values to make their comparisons.  
For a 3°C temperature increase, they assume loss of 2.5% of GDP; for 10°C, they 
assume 50% loss of GDP.  They find their “risk-adjusted WTP” is 15–20 times 
higher than the deterministic WTP when they use a distribution for climate 
sensitivity based on averaging previous studies.  When they use a tighter 
distribution on the climate sensitivity, the risk premium is negligible, highlighting 
the sensitivity of risk premium results to how the uncertainty is specified.  They 
also examine their results as η changes.  Increasing η decreases WTP up until a 
point and then it starts to increase WTP.  This is also found by Anthoff et al. 
(2009) as discussed earlier.  This is because with uncertainty, even if future 
generations will on average be wealthier, there is a chance they could be quite 
poor.  When this probability is high enough, a higher CRRA will lead to a higher 
WTP to prevent the catastrophic outcome.  Thus, when the various meanings of η, 
as discussed earlier, are not disentangled, aversion to inequality effect can 
dominate in situations of low uncertainty and aversion to risk can dominate in 
situations of high uncertainty.   
Newbold and Daigneault then turn to DICE to see if their results hold with a 
more complex model.  They compare BAU with two policies of more aggressive 
and less aggressive abatement.  As in the stylized model, risk-adjusted WTP is 
generally higher than deterministic WTP.  Like Nordhaus (2007), they find a 
negative risk premium for the less aggressive abatement policy, which they 
attribute to the “less severe” damage function used in DICE, again highlighting the 
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importance of how catastrophic damages are modeled.  In particular, the damage 
function is not everywhere convex.  There is a range where an increase in variance 
makes the risk premium more negative because mass is shifted to where marginal 
damages are decreasing.  A negative risk premium is more likely to emerge the 
lower the inflection point in the damage function.   
4.2 Discounting Approaches 
The financial definition of a risk premium discussed earlier shows how viewing 
abatement as an investment could allow calculation of a RP as a rate of return or 
change in the discount rate.  In the previous section we saw that levels of risk 
aversion do alter the discount rate, even when growth is not stochastic.  The 
problem with the deterministic Ramsey setting is that there is only one interest 
rate—r—and as such, it does not address variations in the risk associated with 
different assets.6  Expanding the analysis to include different rates of return based 
on the riskiness of the asset can be done drawing on asset pricing theory, as in 
Wetizman (2007a). Under the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the return needed on 
an asset is a function of its correlation with market returns—the risky investment.  
Let the return on the asset (consider abatement as a type of “asset” that could be 
invested in) be ra, let rs again be the return on a safe asset or the risk-free rate of 
return, let rr, be the return on the risky asset (often taken to be the market in 
finance applications, and we will do that here), and let β be the correlation between 
the returns from the asset and from the risky asset or the market.  Then: 
ra ≈ rs + β(rr – rs).                          (7) 
Thus, the rate of return and the RP for an asset depend on the asset’s 
correlation with economy-wide returns.  This then begs the question: are climate 
damages, which abatement reduces, correlated, anti-correlated, or uncorrelated 
with the rest of the economy?  Most IAMs model damages as a pure production 
_________________________ 
6 Apart from the discussion here, it is worth mentioning, as Dietz (2011b) observed, that since the 
discount rate is dependent on consumption growth rates, each Monte Carlo draw should have its own 
discount rate instead of using exogenous rates as done in the US Social Cost of Carbon for 
Regulatory Impact Analysis report. Indeed, the flat discount rates are inconsistent with the 
assumption in the US government analysis that per capita GDP growth will decline to zero by 2300. 
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externality and damages are thus positively correlated with the overall economy; 
abatement pays off more when the economy is also paying off more.  There is not 
necessarily an economic justification for this assumption (Howarth 2003).  
Climate change can be seen as mostly impacting “outdoor” sectors of the economy 
(e.g., agriculture and coastal recreation), and these could impact utility directly 
(Sterner and Persson 2008), suggesting that the correlation is greater than zero but 
less than one (Weitzman 2007a).  If abatement reduces the risk of catastrophes, the 
correlation with the rest of the economy could even be negative (Brekke and 
Johansson-Stenman 2008).  In this case, abatement reduces the risk of the entire 
portfolio of society’s holdings and thus requires a lower rate of return than even 
safe investments. 
Weitzman (2007a; 2007b) exploits this conceptualization of abatement as a 
type of investment and links the RP for climate change abatement to the “equity 
risk premium puzzle” in finance.  If we model the per capita growth rate of the 
economy as a random variable normally distributed with mean  and variance σ2, 
with δ representing the pure rate of time preference, and η the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, then the rate of return for a risk-free asset is approximated 
by: 
rs ≈ δ + ημ – ½η2σ2,             (8) 
and the risk premium for equities (the risky asset in this model) is approximated 
by: 
RP ≈ E[re] – rs = ησ2.             (9) 
The equity premium puzzle is the conundrum that when plausible parameter 
values are used, it is impossible to explain the large equity premium observed in 
the market.  Weitzman (2007b) resolves this puzzle by positing that there is 
uncertainty over the growth rate such that it has a fat left tail. (Note that, given this 
assumption of non-normality, the approximations in equations 8 and 9 no longer 
hold.) With certain model assumptions, this can imply an infinite risk premium for 
equities!   
Weitzman (2007a; 2009) extends this thinking to the climate change problem.  
He models the growth rate in consumption as uncertain due to potential climate 
damages.  Using a Bayesian updating framework where the growth rate is 
unknown but updated based on limited past observations, the posterior distribution 
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for the growth rate is the fat-tailed Student-t.  Using this student-t distribution, the 
expected marginal utility of an extra sure unit of consumption tends to infinity.  
Even if a somewhat arbitrary bound is used in the model to eliminate the infinity, 
the model still suggests that concern for possibly catastrophic climate impacts 
leads to a very large risk premium.  Others have argued, though, that if the CRRA 
utility function is bounded, WTP may be smaller and much more reasonable than a 
first read of Weitzman (2009) would suggest and could be driven by other factors 
such as risk aversion and the damage function (Newbold and Daigneault 2009; 
Pindyck 2010).  Still, Weitzman’s work points to the fact that there may be 
conditions under which we are willing to pay quite a bit to avoid a very large 
downside exposure from climate change.    
Dietz (2011a) explores the implications of Weitzman’s work by using the IAM 
PAGE with fat-tailed distributions for the climate sensitivity and damage 
exponent.  Damages are bounded at different levels to avoid the infinite WTP that 
Weitzman discusses.  Bounding damages, keeping the probability of catastrophe 
small, and assuming that catastrophic damages do not occur until well into the 
future is enough to make the welfare costs of climate change asymptote, with the 
value determined by the discount rate and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
η (Dietz 2011a).  Dietz (2011a) gets much higher SCC estimates using fat-tailed 
distributions but the level of risk aversion, as captured by η, is still important.  For 
his BAU run and a pure rate of time preference of 0.1 and η=2, he finds the mean 
SCC to be $444/t CO2 in 2008 US$.  For BAU with a pure rate of time preference 
of 1.5 and η=3, the mean estimate is $346/t CO2.   
4.3 Worst Case Approaches 
As opposed to explicitly calculating a risk premium, some authors have suggested 
decision rules that take account of worst-case scenarios more explicitly than 
simply looking at average damages.  McInerney et al. (forthcoming) examine two 
approaches—limited degree of confidence (LDC) and safety first (SF)—that 
demonstrate some concern for welfare in the worst-case scenario.  The former 
maximizes a weighted average of expected welfare and welfare in the worst case 
and the latter maximizes welfare subject to welfare in the worst case remaining 
above some threshold.  With climate change, however, there is no one worst-case 
scenario and the estimates of worst outcomes are very sensitive to sample size, 
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especially when sampling from fat-tailed distributions.  The worst case says 
nothing about the probability of occurrence or about other undesirable outcomes. 
To address these concerns, McInerney et al. substitute conditional value-at-risk 
(CVaR) for the worst-case outcome.  Also termed expected shortfall or tail-value-
at-risk, CVaR is the expected value of the distribution above a given percentile.   
Although McInerney et al. focus on global optimization questions, one can 
apply their approach in a marginal context to add a RP to the SCC.  For instance, 
McInerney et al.’s limited degree of confidence criterion is based on minimizing 
the weighted average of expected damages and CVaR. The SCC could be 
calculated as the marginal of this objective function, i.e., as a weighted average of 
expected damages and the damages above a given percentile.  The weight would 
be based on the degree of risk aversion society exhibited toward catastrophic 
climate outcomes, and with appropriate calibration could capture the WTP to 
reduce the risk of climate catastrophes. 
Another related approach that several papers have explored is optimizing 
decision making under a risk constraint.  If we take such risk constraints to 
implicitly give society’s level of risk aversion, then the tax that would be required 
to get society on the least-cost path that satisfies the constraint could be seen as a 
SCC with a risk premium included (although not one calculated off of a business-
as-usual scenario, as in the US government estimates).  Mastrandrea and Schneider 
(2004) use DICE with different damage functions to examine what carbon taxes 
keep the probability of crossing into “dangerous anthropogenic interference” 
(DAI) below certain levels.  They find that a carbon tax in 2050 of $150 to $200 
per ton of carbon brings the probability of DAI down from about 45% without 
abatement to close to zero.  McInerney and Keller (2008) impose a reliability 
constraint in DICE to model a decision to lower the odds of collapse of the North 
Atlantic circulation to an acceptable level.  The way they model circulation 
collapse in the North Atlantic leads them to conclude that reducing the odds of 
collapse to 1 in 10 requires almost complete decarbonization.  Cooke (in prep) 
infers a probabilistic risk constraint from international agreements.  The difference 
in time discounted damages along the BAU and along an (approximately) optimal 
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path satisfying the risk constraint are a lower bound on WTP to reduce society’s 
risk.7  
5 Conclusion and Future Directions 
While many commentators discuss abatement as a risk management strategy to 
lower the probability of severe climate damages, relatively few authors have 
analytically operationalized this framework.  One way to do so in a regulatory 
framework is through the calculation of a risk premium associated with the social 
cost of carbon.  We have reviewed the work on calculating such a premium to 
date.  Several approaches have been taken to including the risk reduction benefits 
of abatement in SCC values, ranging from deriving a risk premium directly from 
EU equations, to adjusting the discount rate to account for uncertainty and risk 
aversion, to placing greater weight on worst-case outcomes.  As very few authors 
pull out RP values to report independently, it is difficult to gauge how these 
methods compare.    
The work across all approaches suggests that risk premia are likely warranted 
when evaluating abatement options and are not likely to be trivial.  Indeed, our 
review suggests they could actually be very large.  This is in part due to risk 
aversion to catastrophes, which is tangled with other preferences in the standard 
model, and which some studies suggest may be higher than previously considered.  
It is also due to the enormous uncertainty over the climate change damage 
function.  Many IAM studies have used a limited set of damage functions.  
Researchers are now realizing that there are many ways in which scientifically 
plausible catastrophes can be incorporated into the damage function, and that this 
can greatly influence the size of the risk premium. 
As our review makes clear, there is much more work to do on this topic.  Since 
RP values are dependent on whose preferences are being considered, more 
_________________________ 
7 Dietz (2011b) notes that SCC estimates are much more uncertain than estimates of marginal 
abatement costs, particularly given this deep uncertainty about the damage function.  He thus 
recommends setting a long-run emissions target based on our concerns about catastrophic climate 
change, since with an unknown potential for catastrophic damages, marginal benefits from climate 
change are steeply increasing once some threshold is reached, with marginal costs being relatively 
flat: Weitzman’s seminal work thus suggests the use of a quantity instrument.   
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research on individual risk attitudes toward climate change catastrophes would be 
useful, as well as whether the commonly used CRRA utility function is 
appropriate.  As other authors have also stated, further work on modeling climate 
damages is needed from the perspective of risk premia, as well.  Uncertainty 
analysis over not only parameter values of certain damage specifications, but also 
across different damage models would be useful (see Kopp et al. (2011)) as there 
is currently no theoretical reasons to assume one functional form is more accurate 
than another. 
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